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Causation, Truth, and the Law 
Richard Scheines† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Deciding matters of legal liability, in torts and other 
civil actions, requires deciding causation. The injury suffered 
by a plaintiff must be caused by an event or condition due to 
the defendant. The courts distinguish between cause-in-fact 
and proximate causation, where cause-in-fact is guided by the 
“but-for” test: the effect would not have happened, but for the 
cause.1 Proximate causation is a set of legal limitations on 
cause-in-fact.  
As this conference is entitled A Cross-Disciplinary Look 
at Scientific Truth: What’s the Law to Do, I will ignore the 
distinction between cause-in-fact and proximate causation, and 
instead focus on both the sense in which cause-in-fact claims 
can be considered true or false and on the challenges to 
establishing them.  
Before a court can decide on proximate causation, and 
thus on liability or damages, it must decide on the truth of the 
cause-in-fact question: Was the injury suffered by the plaintiff 
caused by the action(s) or inaction(s) of the defendant? For 
example, was John Smith’s liver cancer caused by his exposure 
to trichloroethylene (“TCE”) in a factory that employed him for 
ten years?  
I will focus on what we must assume before cause-in-
fact claims can even be said to have a truth value, that is, 
objectively true or false independent of whether we can know 
it. Philosophers distinguish individual level causal claims 
(cause-in-fact claims) from “general causal claims.”2 I will try to 
  
 † Dr. Scheines is a Professor (and Head) of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon 
University, with courtesy appointments in the Department of Machine Learning and 
the Human-Computer Interaction Institute. 
 1 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1775 
(1985). 
 2 David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 556-57 (1973); see Richard 
Scheines, Causation, in 1 THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 280. 280-88 
(Maryanne Cline Horowitz, ed. 2005). 
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make the difference clear and then discuss the difficulties that 
arise in claiming that either have a determinate truth value. I 
will argue that if there is a truth to the matter about individual 
causal claims, it is parasitic upon the truth of general causal 
claims, and that therefore the relevant issues for the law 
involve deciding on the truth of general causal claims. 
Given the limited amount of relevant empirical scien-
tific evidence that is typically available, however, deciding in a 
legal setting whether such claims are actually true or false can 
be extremely difficult. As courts have no choice but to decide 
such matters, they need a rational process by which to 
synthesize the evidence for or against causal claims—both with 
respect to our best scientific guess about the truth of the claim 
and with respect to the scientific uncertainty about such a 
guess.  
I will sketch the various forms of evidence that are used 
to prove general causal claims and then describe the strategies 
and problems associated with synthesizing the totality of this 
evidence into a single judgment, both with regard to the truth 
of a causal claim and with regard to the uncertainty with 
respect to that judgment. 
II.  INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GENERAL CAUSATION, 
INDETERMINISM, AND TRUTH 
A. Individual Versus General Causal Claims 
Consider first the difference between individual and 
general level causal claims. In legal contexts, the goal is often 
to establish whether one particular event or condition was the 
cause of another particular event or condition. For example, if 
John Smith contracts liver cancer, a court might seek to 
establish whether or not his exposure to TCE in a factory that 
employed him for ten years was the “proximate cause” of his 
particular cancer. In such cases, by saying that exposure to 
TCE caused the disease, courts typically ask whether the 
cancer would not have occurred but for the exposure to TCE.3 
This is an individual level causal claim, and one whose truth, if 
  
 3 See Wright, supra note 1, at 1775; see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: 
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 958-
61 (2001).  
2008] CAUSATION, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 961 
it has one, depends on a counterfactual claim: what would have 
happened to John Smith had he not been exposed to TCE.4  
General causal claims refer to a population of individ-
uals, and concern the probability or average severity of a 
property (for example, a disease) in that population. For 
example, a qualitative general causal claim about TCE and 
liver cancer might be: in a population of factory workers who 
were exposed to TCE, the probability of getting liver cancer 
(the risk among the exposed) is higher than it would have been 
in the same population had they not been exposed to TCE. A 
quantitative version of the same general causal claim: the risk 
of liver cancer among those exposed to TCE was 2%, while the 
risk in the same group, had they not been exposed, would have 
been 1%. Another example is the following: among middle class 
American children between the ages of five and ten, if everyone 
had watched one less hour of TV per day, then the average 
Body Mass Index (“BMI”)5 of the group would have been .5 
point lower than it was.  
Clearly, claiming that TCE causes liver cancer in a 
population of workers does not entail that every worker who 
was exposed to TCE will develop liver cancer, and it does not 
entail that every case of liver cancer among the workers would 
not have happened but for TCE exposure. Similarly, not all 
children would have lost .5 point of BMI had they decreased 
their TV watching by one hour per day, etc. Again, the general 
causal claims each make a counterfactual claim. In the TCE 
and liver cancer case, the claim is: had the same population 
lived the same life, with the exception of not being exposed to 
TCE, then the probability of liver cancer would have been 
lower than it was in the actual world. In the TV and obesity 
case, the claim is: had the same population of American 
children lived the same life, with the exception that they had 
watched an hour less of TV per day, then the average BMI in 
the population would have been .5 point lower than it was in 
the actual world. 
  
 4 David Lewis developed the most influential account of counterfactuals in 
philosophy, see DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (2001); and Donald Rubin developed 
the most influential account of causation based on counterfactuals in Statistics, see 
Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and 
Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 (1974). 
 5 BMI is calculated as 703 x (weight in pounds) / (height in inches)2.  
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B. General Causal Claims and Truth 
Since our target is the law, which for the most part 
deals with events that have already occurred, I will restrict my 
attention to causal claims about things that have already 
happened. For example, was John Smith’s liver cancer caused 
by his exposure to TCE, or was the rise in obesity in the late 
twentieth century caused by an increase in TV watching?  
On this sort of counterfactual account of causation, 
consider what it might mean to assert that general causal 
claims have a truth value, that is, that they are either true or 
false in the actual world. Two objections arise immediately: the 
vagueness and objectivity of counterfactual possible worlds, 
and the meaning of probability. 
That causal claims in the actual world might depend 
upon what would or would not happen in alternative possible 
worlds bothers almost everyone. The problem is that most 
descriptions of alternative possible worlds seem intolerably 
vague. For example, in the TV and obesity claim we are asked 
to consider a world in which the same children lived the same 
life but watched one hour less of TV per day. How exactly do we 
imagine the change in their world so that they each watch one 
hour less of TV per day? Do we make the TV inoperable one 
hour before they would have turned it off anyway? Convince 
their parents to intervene and select an hour of TV every day 
the child will no longer watch? Offer them just enough of a 
candy reward to get them to voluntarily shut down the TV one 
hour before they would have anyway? Make them replace the 
first hour of TV they would have watched with exercise? The 
counterfactual as we stated it is vague—it can’t answer any of 
these questions even though they all obviously matter for 
assessing the causal claim.  
One can, however, fully specify a manipulation or inter-
vention that would change the actual world to the possible 
world we are considering in a way that eliminates all this 
vagueness. Donald Rubin famously articulated a counterfactual 
theory of causation based on drug trials.6 If we consider an 
experiment in which some people received a pill containing a 
drug (the treatment) and the other half received a pill identical 
in appearance, taste, etc. (the control), then the causal 
inference problem with respect to the drug amounts to missing 
  
 6 See Rubin, supra note 4. 
2008] CAUSATION, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 963 
data from alternative possible worlds. For the people who took 
the treatment pill, we are missing the data on what would have 
happened to them if they had taken the control pill. For the 
people who took the control pill, we are missing the data on 
what would have happened to them if they had taken the 
treatment pill (Table 1). 
 Took treatment pill Took control pill 
Jane Doe Cured ??? 
Person 2 Ill ??? 
. . .   
Person N - 1 ??? Ill 
Person N ??? Ill 
Table 1   Missing data needed to assess causal efficacy of treatment. 
Since the pills are identical in appearance, etc., surely it 
is not difficult to be perfectly precise about the alternative 
worlds under discussion. Jane Doe took the treatment pill and 
recovered—what would have happened if she had taken the 
control pill? It isn’t hard to imagine the antecedent: an 
alternative world in which we leave everything as we found it 
in the real world, except for removing the drug from the pill 
Jane took. Knowing whether or not, in this hypothetical world, 
Jane would have remained ill or recovered is not so simple.  
The point is this: the problem of vagueness is not 
insurmountable. It requires being clear about the intervention 
performed to transform the actual world into the counter-
factual world.7 In the TCE and liver cancer case, we might 
describe a world in which the factory workers behaved 
identically, but the de-greasing chemical used in the factory  
  
 7 The idea of making counterfactuals clear by formalizing the idea of an 
intervention has been developed extensively. See generally JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: 
MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000); PETER SPIRTES ET AL., CAUSATION, 
PREDICTION, AND SEARCH (2d ed. 2000); James Robins, A New Approach to Causal 
Inference in Mortality Studies with Sustained Exposure Periods—Application to Control 
of the Healthy Worker Survivor Effect, 7 MATHEMATICAL MODELLING 1393 (1986) 
(errata appears in 14 COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS WITH APPLICATIONS 917 (1987)). 
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in which they worked was changed from TCE to a specific 
alternative known to be non-carcinogenic.8  
Assuming that vagueness is not an issue, what about 
the probability part of general causal claims? Recall that to 
assess the TCE and liver cancer claim, we need to know the 
probability of liver cancer in the population exposed to TCE 
and in the same population not exposed to TCE. 
What is it for a probability claim to be true? Given two 
claims about a coin in my pocket: 
H1: the coin is fair (probability of heads = .5) 
H2: the coin is loaded 75% toward heads (probability of heads = .75) 
What is it for H1 to be true but H2 false? Unfortunately, neither 
hypothesis puts any binding constraints on any experiment we 
might conduct in the actual world. We might say that H1 
implies that the proportion of heads in a very long sequence of 
flips should converge to .5 as the sequence gets longer and 
longer, but that this is not the case for H2. But the “should” in 
this sentence is itself probabilistic. Any finite sequence of coin 
flips is consistent with both of these hypotheses. Perhaps this 
is just philosophical obstructionism. Even though we don’t yet 
possess an entirely satisfactory account of what it means for H1 
to be true and H2 false in the actual world, several accounts are 
out there.9 We don’t want to put the legal system on hold until 
the philosophers can agree on a semantics for probability. 
To summarize, provided we can be sufficiently precise 
about the manipulations (interventions) that will transport us 
from the actual to a counterfactual possible world, and 
provided probability claims have a coherent semantics, then 
general causal claims have a truth value as well. At minimum, 
their truth depends on the probability of the effect in two 
populations.  
C. Individual Causal Claims and Truth 
Now consider whether individual causal claims have a 
determinate truth value. Was John Smith’s liver cancer caused 
by his exposure to TCE? Was Jane Doe’s illness cured by the 
experimental drug she took? Again, these claims depend upon 
  
 8 Presuming there is such a thing! 
 9 See Interpretations of Probability, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOS-
OPHY (rev. July 7, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/. 
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evaluating counterfactuals. What happens to John Smith in  
the world in which he wasn’t exposed to TCE? What happens  
to Jane Doe in the world in which she takes the placebo  
pill? Having argued that these counterfactual worlds are not 
necessarily insurmountably vague, let us now consider whether 
these questions have definite answers. 
Again, the answer depends on probability, but in a 
completely different sense than we have already discussed. It 
depends upon whether the world is deterministic, as we are 
psychologically built to expect, or indeterministic, as the 
physicists tell us it is.  
Roughly, in a deterministic world, the past fully deter-
mines the future. What happens to Jane Doe after she takes 
the pill is not a lottery, but a sure thing. We might not know 
enough about the details to be able to predict what will happen, 
but that is an epistemic limitation and not a feature of the 
world we inhabit. In an indeterministic world (still guided by 
physical laws), the past does not determine the future, but at 
most determines the probabilities of possible futures.  
Although Einstein detested the thought of an indeter-
ministic world and said so (“[God] does not play dice”10), in 
modern physics God is indeed a gambler. When a single 
electron is shot at a screen that records the point where it 
“hits,” all that can be predicted about its landing site is its 
probability. The probabilities can be predicted perfectly, and 
experiments using thousands of electrons have confirmed the 
accuracy of these probabilistic predictions, but the exact 
position on a single trial cannot be predicted perfectly, no 
matter what we know about the electron. Even if we learned 
everything there was to know about the electron midway 
through its flight, and the universe within which it traveled, it 
would not be enough to determine where it will hit the screen. 
We are simply not evolved to accept this idea fully, but this is 
the way the world seems to be. 
Translated back to Jane Doe, if the world is truly 
indeterministic, then although she took the treatment pill and 
recovered in the actual world, there is no fact to the matter 
about what would have happened to her if she had taken the 
control pill. And it has nothing to do with the vagueness of the 
counterfactual.  
  
 10 Albert Einstein, Letter to Max Born, Dec. 4, 1926, in LEWIS S. FEUER, 
EINSTEIN AND THE GENERATIONS OF SCIENCE 80 (2d ed. 1982). 
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If the world is truly indeterministic, then even if we 
could go back in time and replay the world millions of times 
from the exact spot we like, for example, leaving everything the 
same but changing the contents of Jane’s pill, the outcome on 
each play is still truly a lottery. Analogous to the electron’s 
landing site on the screen, the probabilities for Jane’s outcome 
might be determined and perhaps knowable, but the outcome 
on each play is not. Thus, if one uses the basic legal test for 
causation, that is, the but-for test, then individual level causal 
claims simply do not have a truth value in a world in which 
God actually does play dice.  
If the world is deterministic, then probability state-
ments capture only our epistemic uncertainty, not something 
more fundamental about the world. For example, suppose that 
a population exposed to TCE has a probability of getting liver 
cancer of .02. It might be the case that some people in the 
population have an unusual genetic makeup such that, if they 
are exposed to TCE they will definitely get liver cancer, but if 
they are not exposed they definitely will not get cancer, and 
that 2% of this population has the unlucky gene. In 1960, 
before we could sequence an individual’s genes, we would not 
be able to tell which of the individuals were lucky or unlucky. 
Thus, for any individual J, chosen at random, J’s fate is 
determined, but our epistemic access to it is limited to the true 
claim: “J was exposed to TCE and thus the probability that  
he will get liver cancer is 2%.” The underlying situation is 
deterministic, but due to our limited access appears indeter-
ministic. Philosophers refer to such a world as pseudo-
indeterministic.11  
In a pseudo-indeterministic world, individual level 
causal claims do have a truth value. Although we might not 
have access to his genome, individual J either has the unlucky 
gene or he doesn’t, and whichever it is determines his cancer 
outcome. If individual J got liver cancer, and he had the 
unlucky gene, then the claim that J would not have gotten liver 
cancer but for the TCE exposure is true, even though we cannot 
know it until we can sequence his genome or find some other 
marker that correlates perfectly with the unlucky gene.  
So which world are we in? Electrons may be truly 
indeterministic, but is cancer? Even if a gene exists which 
makes an individual vulnerable to TCE exposure, cancer 
  
 11 See SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 7, at 19-29. 
2008] CAUSATION, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 967 
requires a complicated series of genetic mutations and other 
developments, all of which can happen in a number of different 
ways, including insult from TCE, cosmic rays, a failure of the 
DNA repair mechanisms, etc. Perhaps quantum mechanical 
indeterminism does play a role in TCE exposure. Perhaps TCE 
interacts with some molecule in codon 61 of the H-ras 
protooncogene,12 the result being to move the probability of 
mutation in this gene slightly higher but leaving us with 
nothing, even in principle, that we could measure or observe 
about an individual of whom we could say that but for TCE, 
they would not have gotten liver cancer. I don’t know, and right 
now I think it is safe to say that no one else does either.  
If the question of whether individual level causal claims 
have a truth value depends on whether the world is pseudo-
indeterministic or truly indeterministic, this is not so for 
general causal claims.  
General causal claims involve the probability of the 
effect in a population that was exposed to the cause and the 
probability of the effect in the same population not exposed to 
the cause. These probability claims have a truth value 
regardless if the world is pseudo-indeterministic or truly 
indeterministic. Consider again the probability of liver cancer 
and TCE exposure, and suppose our general claim is that the 
probability of liver cancer is .02 if you are exposed to TCE, and 
.01 if not. In the pseudo-indeterministic world depicted in 
Figure 1, 10% of the population has an unlucky gene (gene L) 
that produces liver cancer always, and another, separate 10% 
  
 12 This is the suspected loci of TCE’s effect on mice in tumorigenesis studies. 
Richard J. Bull, Mode of Action of Liver Tumor Induction by Trichloroethylene and Its 
Metabolites, Trichloroacetate and Dichloroacetate. 108 (Supp. 2) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
241, 254 (2000), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid= 
1637759&blobtype=pdf. 
Figure 1   Pseudo-indeterministic population. 
Gene V
10% 
Gene L 
10% 
 
Population 
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of the population has a vulnerability gene (gene V) that gives 
you liver cancer whenever you are exposed to TCE (and fails to 
prevent the first gene from giving you cancer when you are not 
exposed to TCE).  
Likewise, we can imagine a truly indeterministic world 
in which everyone’s propensity for getting liver cancer is moved 
from 10% to 20% with TCE exposure, but that there is nothing 
hidden to be discovered that will determine the outcome.  
D. The Primacy of General Causal Claims 
So individual causal claims have a truth value in a 
pseudo-indeterministic world, but upon what does their truth 
depend? Essentially, it depends on answering a counterfactual 
question of the form: would the ‘effect’ have failed to occur ‘but 
for’ the cause? Ignoring the many difficulties with this simple 
account of actual causation (such as overdetermination13 or pre-
emption14), consider again what is required to evaluate such 
counterfactual claims. Consider two claims: (1) John Smith 
would not have gotten liver cancer but for exposure to TCE and 
(2) John Smith would not have gotten liver cancer but for 
wearing brown socks to work on Mondays. We must be able to 
assess whether John Smith’s life would have produced liver 
cancer in each of the two counterfactual worlds: (1) the world in 
which he lives his life exactly as before but is not exposed to 
TCE and (2) the world in which he lives his life exactly as 
before but does not wear brown socks to work on Mondays. 
Assessing whether he gets liver cancer in these worlds requires 
the general causal knowledge about how the world would have 
responded to such changes.  
Once we decide, in our counterfactual world, exactly 
how to change John Smith’s circumstances, then the question 
of whether or not he gets liver cancer in this alternative world 
depends entirely on the causal laws we take to hold in all the 
possible worlds we consider. Given that the shift from wearing 
brown socks to black socks on Mondays is sufficiently minimal, 
  
 13 For example, when several soldiers in a firing squad shoot real bullets 
accurately, the prisoner’s death is overdetermined. For any individual soldier, it is false 
to say that the prisoner would not have died but for the soldier. We want each soldier 
to come out as a cause. 
 14 For example, when spy 1 pokes a hole in the canteen of an enemy about to 
cross a desert, he pre-empts the effect of spy 2, who had previously filled the canteen 
with poison. It is false to say that the enemy would not have died, but for either spy. 
We want spy 1 to be the cause and not spy 2.  
2008] CAUSATION, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 969 
then Smith still gets cancer because of the general causal 
claim: sock color has no causal influence on liver cancer.  
Halpern and Pearl,15 Woodward,16 and others who have 
articulated clear accounts of individual level causal claims  
all require as input: (1) what happened in the real world,  
(2) precision about how the counterfactual world is to differ 
from the actual world as a result of removing or adding the 
“cause,” and (3) the general causal laws (usually called the 
structural equations) relevant to the events discussed. The 
moral is clear: we cannot assess the truth of individual level 
causal claims until we have the general causal laws relevant to 
the events at issue. 
E. The Probability of Causation 
If we know the general causal claims, that is, the risks 
of those exposed and of those not exposed, then we can turn to 
a weaker notion than truth for assessing our individual but-for 
causal claims. We can compute what is called the probability of 
causation (“PC”), a number that roughly corresponds to the 
probability that someone exposed would have avoided the 
disease had they not been exposed.17 The PC is based on what is 
called the attributable fraction of risk in a population (AF): 
exposed)P(disease|
unexposed)P(disease|exposed)P(disease|
ed)Risk(expos
osed)Risk(unexped)Risk(expos
AF
−
=
−
=
 
For example, if the risk of liver cancer among TCE 
exposed workers is 2%, and would have been 1% had they not 
been exposed, then the AF = .5, so half of the liver cancers 
  
 15 Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl, Causes and Explanations: A Structural-
Model Approach. Part I: Causes, 56 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 843, 843-87 (2005). 
 16 JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION 3-24 (2003). 
 17 COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE 
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS 7-5 to -6 
(Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2007) 
[hereinafter DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING]; Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, 
Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321, 321-22 
(2000). 
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observed in TCE exposed workers can be assumed to be the 
result of TCE exposure.  
In many cases we have data on widely defined 
populations, for example, factory workers in Ohio, but no data 
on subpopulations, for example, workers 40 to 45 years in age, 
or workers who have a close ancestor with liver cancer, etc. In 
such cases it is typical to use the AF from the most narrowly 
defined and most informative population possible. For example, 
the risks for the Ohio factory workers might be 2% for exposed 
and 1% for unexposed, but among 40- to 45-year-old workers 
with a history of liver cancer in their family, the risks might be 
6% for exposed and 5% for unexposed, making the AF = .06 –
.05/.06 = 16.67%. So if Robert Jones is a non-descript Ohio 
factory worker who was exposed to TCE and got liver cancer, 
then the probability that his liver cancer was caused by TCE 
was 50%, but if Tim Lewis is a 43-year-old factory worker 
exposed to TCE with a father who had liver cancer, then the 
probability that his liver cancer was caused by TCE was much 
lower: 16.7%. 
As to truth, the probability of causation is no help at all. 
Just as it is not true to say that a given coin flip came out 
heads because the coin was loaded 75% heads, it is not true to 
say that a given individual’s cancer was caused by TCE 
exposure because the probability of causation was 75%. A high 
probability of causation,18 or something like it, might be what 
the law must resort to in deciding torts and similar issues, but 
it should not be confused with assenting to the truth of a but-
for claim.  
III. EVIDENCE FOR GENERAL CAUSAL CLAIMS 
So the truth or probability of an individual causal claim 
depends upon the general causal laws. It is to the problem of 
deciding on the general causal laws that I now turn. As I have 
already stressed, assessing general causal claims requires com-
paring a real population (e.g., Actual Population 1, Figure 2) 
 
  
 18 PC is objectionable for several reasons, not just that it falls short of truth. 
Sander Greenland and Jamie Robins have argued that a better measure of the 
plaintiff’s injury is an estimate of the years of life lost (“YLL”). Since YLL is also either 
something that might be determined by exposure, or only have its probability 
determined by exposure, I have no stake in this debate: all the issues regarding the 
truth of individual causal claims apply to YLL and PC equally. See Greenland & 
Robins, supra note 17, at 346. 
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Figure 2   Association versus causation.19 
 
with a counterfactual one (e.g., Counterfactual Population 1, 
Figure 2). Clearly we cannot go back in time and remove TCE 
or change the commercials children were exposed to. Can we 
compare workers exposed to TCE to other workers not exposed 
to TCE? Yes, but comparing an exposed population (Actual 
Population 1, Figure 2) to another population that we observe 
not to be exposed (Actual Population 2, Figure 2) reveals 
association, but not necessarily causation. 
This is because an actual population of workers not 
exposed to TCE (Actual Population 2, Figure 2) might differ 
from the workers exposed to TCE (Actual Population 1, Figure 
2) in other ways that affect cancer, such as diet, income, etc. 
For example, it is nearly certain that children five to 
eight years of age who were in fact exposed to fewer than ten 
junk food commercials per day had a lower frequency of obesity 
in 2005 than children who were exposed to more than ten. But 
because it is also nearly certain that this group of children 
differs in other important ways from the population described 
in the claim, for example, their parents are more educated, 
wealthier, etc., this is not the appropriate contrast class for 
causation. The appropriate contrast class is the same group of 
  
 19 The expression P(Cancer | TCE) denotes the probability of cancer among 
those exposed to TCE. It also might be referred to as the conditional probability of 
cancer, given exposure to TCE. The expression P(Cancer | Set to TCE) would denote 
the probability of cancer among those upon whom we intervened to force exposure to 
TCE.  
Actual Population 1: 
TCE Exposure Observed 
 
P(Cancer | TCE) 
Counterfactual Population 1:
Set to no TCE 
 
P(Cancer | Set to no TCE) 
Causation 
Association
Actual Population 2: 
No TCE Exposure Observed 
 
P(Cancer | no TCE) 
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children, living the same life, but with the junk food commer-
cials removed, or replaced with other sorts of commercials. In 
the first case, we are comparing children we observed being 
exposed to a lot of junk food commercials to children we 
observed being exposed to few commercials, and this 
comparison would undoubtedly reveal a statistical association 
between junk food and obesity. In the second case, we are 
comparing children we observed being exposed to a lot of junk 
food commercials to the same children after a hypothetical 
intervention in which we go back in time and change their 
exposure to commercials from a lot to a little. It is this com-
parison that reveals the causal relationship, but which is, in 
the deepest sense, unobservable.  
As the population under a counterfactual, hypothetical 
intervention cannot be observed, how are scientists to gather 
evidence about this counterfactual population? This is the 
problem of causal inference. 
A. Randomized Trials 
Sir Ronald Fisher, the brilliant and prolific British stat-
istician, provided in the 1930s what is still the gold standard 
today for causal inference: the randomized trial (“RT”).20 In its 
simplest form, an RT randomly splits a population into two 
subgroups (which we can expect on average to be identical), 
thus creating two versions of the same population, and then 
exposes one subpopulation to the cause (the “treated” group) 
and one to the absence of the cause (the “control” group). The 
frequency of the effect in the two groups provides evidence of 
the probability of the effect in the two populations we seek: one 
in which the cause is present, and an identical copy in which 
the cause is not present. Subtleties abound, but the basic 
strategy is sound and taught in every introductory research 
methods course.  
The problem, of course, is that in a number of situations 
performing an RT is either ethically or practically impossible. 
We simply cannot intentionally expose half of a population to 
TCE and look for liver cancer.  
There are essentially two recourses to an RT: (1) we can 
statistically adjust for naturally occurring differences in two 
populations, or (2) we can perform very small versions of RTs 
  
 20 See RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 
(4th ed. 1932). 
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on animals we don’t seem to mind harming, for example, 
rodents.  
B. Epidemiological Studies 
Epidemiological studies involve observing human 
populations in which we do not control exposure to a cause and 
thus must resort to recourse (b): that is, epidemiological studies 
must statically adjust for naturally occurring differences in the 
exposed and nonexposed populations before they can claim 
evidence of causation. Statistical adjustment requires that we 
know all the relevant features upon which individuals differ 
besides being exposed to the cause or not. For example, a 
subpopulation that is exposed to TCE, for example, automotive 
factory workers who handle paint strippers that contain TCE, 
and a subpopulation that is not exposed to TCE, for example, 
workers on a chicken farm, may differ in more ways than just 
TCE exposure. The chicken farm workers may be different in 
age, have different diets, etc.  
If we measure all the relevant differences, that is, those 
that also might cause liver cancer, then we can often adjust for 
these differences statistically and test for differences in liver 
cancer rates among the groups after this adjustment. If we do 
not know all the relevant differences, however, then this 
strategy fails. For example, if, unbeknownst to us, the 
autoworkers’ drinking water contains some other set of 
chemicals that cause liver cancer, while the farm workers’ 
water does not, and we don’t adjust for this, then our inference 
will be unsound.  
A raft of other methodological issues confront epidemi-
ologists, but the scientific evidence from such studies can in 
some instances be compelling, for example, cigarette smoking 
and lung cancer. 
C. Toxicological and Animal Studies  
In many cases, animals like rats or mice or rabbits or 
chimps share enough of human physiology to make it plausible 
to extrapolate from experiments with animals to what would 
happen in a similar experiment with humans. Biologists fre-
quently perform controlled experiments on rodents to garner 
evidence to show whether some chemical causes cancer. They 
expose some rodents to a control, and others that are gene-
tically identical and raised in the same environment to the 
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chemical of interest, and then compare the frequency of 
cancerous tumors. In some cases they can examine extremely 
detailed mechanisms by which the chemical might lead to a 
tumor by doing cell physiology on both the animals under study 
and human cells.  
There are a number of informative and accessible 
discussions of the wide variety of evidence that can be used for 
causal inference.21 Although in my view the topic deserves 
dozens of books, it is out of my scope to say more here. In 
summary, scientists have long recognized that there are at 
least three distinct kinds of evidence that bear on the truth of 
general causal claims:22 
• Interventional studies on humans (e.g., RTs) 
• Non-interventional (observational) studies on 
humans (e.g., Epidemiological studies) 
• Mechanistic/toxicological evidence (e.g., animal and 
cell studies) 
IV.  COMBING THE EVIDENCE FOR CAUSATION 
To come to a reasoned position on the status of a general 
causal claim, especially in a legal setting, we must (1) combine 
all the available evidence into a single judgment on whether 
the claim is true and (2) express the degree of our uncertainty 
about the claim.  
In many cases, the evidence for a general causal claim is 
mixed. On some questions, there are RTs that show that a drug 
or treatment has a positive effect, others which show no effect, 
and still others which show a negative effect.23 As they are 
more complicated methodologically, epidemiological studies 
often present mixed evidence for a general causal claim. In 
many situations animal studies also show mixed results. 
Rationally combining multiple pieces of similar evidence, for 
  
 21 See, e.g., DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING, supra note 17, at 7-2 to -5; 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING. 
(2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2004/index.htm; FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000), 
available at http://www.rashkind.com/researchlinks.htm. 
 22 See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 20. 
 23 See, e.g., A.R. White et al., A Meta-Analysis of Acupuncture Techniques for 
Smoking Cessation, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 393, 393-97 (1999). 
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example, multiple RTs, is difficult but often feasible. The real 
challenge is to rationally combine different sources of scientific 
evidence into a single judgment about the truth of a general 
causal claim.  
A. Meta-Analysis 
For many general causal claims, for example, hormone 
therapy and breast cancer, there are often several distinct RTs 
in the published literature. Optimally combining the evidence 
from such studies is a topic of its own, called meta-analysis. A 
meta-analysis involves mathematically combining the results 
from multiple but comparable RTs to derive a summary 
estimate of the effect of some cause on some effect, often 
involving health, that appropriately combines the results of all 
the individual studies.24  
The technique is not limited to combining RTs, but can 
also be used to combine the evidence from several epidemiolo-
gical (observational) studies, provided the populations studied 
are comparable. If the populations vary, then a related 
technique called meta-regression25 sometimes allows pooling  
of data in a principled way. Recent work by Eloise Kaizar26 
improves on meta-regression when data from both RTs and 
observational studies are available on a similar general causal 
claim.  
Meta-analytic methods are in general quite useful when 
there are multiple studies on the same causal claim. For 
example, the 2006 Institute of Medicine Committee on 
Asbestos did a quantitative meta-analysis on studies which 
individually estimated the effect of asbestos exposure on any  
of a number of different cancers, reporting a quantitative 
estimate that is a combination of the estimates from the 
  
 24 See, e.g., Kay Dickersin & Jesse A. Berlin, Meta-Analysis: State-of-the-
Science, 14 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 154 (1992); P. Easterbrook & J. Berlin, Meta-Analysis, 
341 LANCET 965 (1993); K.A. L’Abbe et al., Meta-Analysis in Clinical Research, 107 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 224 (1987).  
 25 See Sander Greenland, Can Meta-Analysis Be Salvaged?, 140 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 783 (1994); Sander Greenland & Keith O’Rourke, On the Bias Produced 
by Quality Scores in Meta-Analysis, and a Hierarchical View of Proposed Solutions, 2 
BIOSTATISTICS 463 (2001). 
 26 Eloise E. Kaizar, Combining Information from Diverse Sources (2006) 
(Ph.D. Thesis, Dep’t of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University); Eloise E. Kaizar, 
MetaAnalyses Are Observational Studies: How Lack of Randomization Impacts 
Analysis, 100 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1233 (2005). 
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individual studies, as well as measures expressing the 
uncertainty of such estimates.27  
No matter how sophisticated the meta-analytic tech-
nique, however, it is still limited to combining statistical 
evidence from different human studies into a single statistical 
estimate of the effect size, for example, the probability of  
the effect in the population exposed to the cause and the 
probability of the effect in the same population not exposed to 
the cause.  
Meta-analysis of any form, however, cannot incorporate 
toxicological/mechanistic knowledge, nor can it easily factor  
in the quality of the studies being combined into a single 
estimate.  
There is a technique, called the Bayesian approach,28 for 
combining all available evidence, including a scientist’s back-
ground knowledge, judgment, etc., into a single judgment about 
the nature and uncertainty of a general causal claim. 
B. The Bayesian Approach  
Several forests have been sacrificed explicating and 
debating the pros and cons of the Bayesian approach,29 so I will 
try to avoid piling on and provide only the briefest of sketches. 
There are many forms of the Bayesian approach, but the most 
appealing, in my view, is the most extreme. In this view, 
almost any statement—for example, “TCE causes liver cancer” 
or “your next child will be born with blond hair” or “the moon 
was formed by a collision between a proto-planet and the 
Earth”—can be assigned a credence, or degree of belief between  
0 and 1, and the degrees of belief can be interpreted as 
probabilities. In some cases the probability can be assigned 
objectively, for example, the objective probability of your next 
child being born with blond hair, or any of a number of 
heritable diseases, can be worked out by a genetics counselor 
  
 27 COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASBESTOS: SELECTED 
CANCERS 2 (Nat’l Academies Press 2006).  
 28 Named after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, who lived during the first half of 
the eighteenth century.  
 29 For a sampler, see JAMES O. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY AND 
BAYESIAN STATISTICS (2d ed. 1985); WILLIAM M. BOLSTAD, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN 
STATISTICS (2d ed. 2007); ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (2d ed. 
2004); COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN 
APPROACH (1993); RICHARD E. NEAPOLITAN, LEARNING BAYESIAN NETWORKS (2004); 
A.P. Dawid, Probability, Causality and the Empirical World: A Bayes-De Dinetti-
Popper-Borel Synthesis, 19 STATISTICAL SCI. 44-57 (2004). 
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with appropriate access to your family history and perhaps 
some of your blood. In other cases the probability corresponds 
to nothing more than a subjective degree of belief. For example, 
having little or no evidence to go on, in 2007 I may assign a 
probability of .2 to the statement, “Blu-Ray will win the format 
wars over HD-DVD for the next generation of DVDs.” 
The approach provides a principled way to compute the 
probability one should assign to a hypothesis H, after you have 
seen a new piece of evidence E, notated as P(H|E).30 The 
fundamental theorem which drives the approach is extremely 
simple to state and prove: 
P(E)
P(E|H)P(H)
P(H|E) =  
The numerator on the right involves P(E|H), called the 
likelihood since it represents the probability of the evidence E 
given H is true, and P(H), called the prior, the probability 
assigned to H prior to seeing the evidence. The denominator, 
P(E), is the probability of the evidence without any consider-
ation of the hypothesis H. The target, P(H|E), is called the 
posterior as it reflects the probability of H after seeing the 
evidence E.  
A classic use of the formula is in computing the 
probability of having a disease, given a diagnostic test result. 
For example, suppose a 20-year-old upper middle class hetero-
sexual male Jim gets a blood test for HIV, and it comes out 
positive. Jim is scared, but what is the probability of H: that he 
is actually infected with HIV, given the evidence from the blood 
test E? First suppose that the test is 98% reliable. That is, 
suppose that the probability of the test coming out positive 
given HIV infection, P(E|H), is .98. Now Jim is truly terrified. 
Next suppose that P(H), the prior probability of a 20-year-old 
upper middle class heterosexual male having HIV, is 1 in 1000 
(.001). Finally, suppose that P(E), the probability of a blood test 
coming out positive is 1 in 125 (.008). Then, to Jim’s relief, the 
posterior probability of HIV = .1225: 
1225.
008.)(
001.)(*98.)|(
)|( =
=
==
=
EP
HPHEP
EHP  
  
 30 Also referred to as the probability of H conditional on E, or H given E. 
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The apparent discrepancy between the 98% reliability of the 
HIV test and posterior probability of HIV of 12.25% is due to 
the low prior probability of HIV in Jim’s cohort, and the 
frequency of positive blood tests. If one views the situation as a 
Bayesian, however, the evidence did make a big difference. 
Before taking the test, the probability of Jim having HIV was 1 
in 1000. After the positive test, the probability moved to about 
1 in 8, a huge jump.  
The Bayesian approach has been used (and misused) in 
assessing forensic evidence like DNA testing in courtrooms for 
well over a decade.31  
In our context, the potential utility of the approach 
should be apparent. Beginning with some prior belief over a 
general causal claim Hc, for example, that TCE causes liver 
cancer, then for each new piece of evidence, in the form of an 
RT, or epidemiological study, toxicological study, or what have 
you, one can use the Bayesian approach to compute the 
probability that Hc is true given this evidence. When all the 
evidence is in, we emerge with a posterior probability of Hc, 
that is, the probability of Hc given all the evidence available.  
In practice, the Bayesian approach is far from a 
panacea. In typical scientific contexts involving a community of 
scientists, it is very difficult to move from inchoate and diverse 
sorts of background knowledge to a prior, that is, a degree of 
belief in the causal claim prior to reviewing the evidence. 
Further, while “updating” to a posterior from certain kinds of 
evidence is reasonably straightforward, updating from other 
kinds of evidence is not. For example, consider computing the 
probability of liver cancer as a function of TCE exposure. After 
a few studies estimating the dependence of liver cancer risk on 
TCE concentration in work environment air, we can use the 
Bayesian approach to incorporate a new sample of 400 factory 
workers who were exposed to air with varying amounts of TCE 
concentrations for ten years, for example. As the probability of 
liver cancer as a function of TCE exposure is the hypothesis 
under study, the likelihood in Bayes’ formula is objective. That 
is, the probability of seeing a particular frequency of liver 
cancers given that TCE does cause liver cancer, is objectively, 
mathematically derivable, and from that we can apply Bayes’ 
theorem. 
  
 31 See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane, Misuse of Bayesian Statistics in Court, 
CHANCE, Spring 2006, at 38. 
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What we cannot do, at least in any objective way, is to 
use the approach to update on evidence that shows rats 
exposed to 50 ppb TCE get tumors at three times the rate of 
those exposed to 1 ppb. What is the likelihood of this evidence, 
assuming TCE does cause liver cancer in humans? Here we are 
often beyond mathematics and statistics and into opinion about 
the comparability of rats and humans.32 Other features of 
studies, for example, the quality of measures employed in an 
epidemiological survey, are also extremely hard to incorporate 
in any objective way into a Bayesian analysis. In general, this 
is referred to as the “objectivity of the likelihood” problem. 
Besides the sheer difficulty in performing the appropriate 
computations, the approach is a regulative ideal, but it is still 
far from the practical device we want to get us to a rational 
judgment on the truth of a general causal claim.  
Finally, the probability of a hypothesis does not 
correspond in any simple way to the chances of it being true in 
the world. The justification for the technique is decision-
theoretic, and is based more on a theory of rationality than it is 
on correspondence to the truth.33  
This is not to say that the technique is hopeless. It isn’t. 
An actual example of using it for assessing a general causal 
claim relevant to the law comes from the National Academy of 
Science’s (“NAS”) BEIR IV report, which sought to estimate the 
carcinogenicity of plutonium in humans.34 By assuming that 
the ratio of carcinogenic potencies of plutonium to various 
other radionuclides like radium would be roughly constant 
across species, the Committee managed to combine very 
limited human data involving plutonium, with extensive 
animal data on plutonium and radium, and more extensive 
human data on radium, to emerge with a posterior over the 
hypothesis concerning the carcinogenicity of plutonium in 
humans.  
  
 32 This is not always the case. See William H. DuMouchel & Jeffrey E. 
Harris, Bayes Methods for Combining the Results of Cancer Studies in Humans and 
Other Species, 78 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 293 (1983). 
 33 For a recent philosophical discussion of the epistemological view of the 
Bayesian approach, see LUC BOVENS & STEPHAN HARTMANN, BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
(2003). 
 34 COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS, 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS OF RADON AND OTHER INTERNALLY 
DEPOSITED ALPHA-EMITTERS: BEIR IV (Nat’l Academy Press 1988). 
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Although I have been focusing on the problems of 
combining different sorts of evidence and ignoring the issue of 
expressing the uncertainty over causal claims, this comes for 
free with the Bayesian approach. For simple propositions, like 
R: “it will rain on Labor Day 2010 in Brooklyn,” the posterior 
will be a probability between 0 and 1. If, in scientist A’s poster-
ior R has a probability of .93, and in scientist B’s posterior R 
has a probability of .55, then A is in some sense more certain 
about R than B. Both scientists are more confident that R is 
true than that R is false—so they both in some sense believe R 
is true—but their degree of uncertainty is not the same. They 
should both take an even bet on R, but A would give much 
longer odds than B.  
For more complicated hypotheses (for example, “it will 
rain x inches on Labor Day 2010”), where we are asked to put a 
probability over each possible value of x, then the posterior is 
not a number but a probability distribution. For example, 
scientist A might have a posterior like the left side of Figure 3, 
while scientist B has a posterior like the right side of Figure 3. 
Roughly, the height of the graph corresponds to how much 
probability the scientist distributes over that number of inches 
of rain. The rectangle over 0 represents the probability of no 
rain (0 inches), which is .07 for Scientist A and .45 for Scientist 
B, while the rest of the posterior is distributed over rain from 
0-1.2 inches on that day. If it does rain, then Scientist A seems 
to put the most probability over around .3 inches, while Scien-
tist B, although he is less confident that it will rain, if it does, 
he deems it most probable to rain a little over .4 inches.  
We can do the same with causal claims regarding the 
relative risk of liver cancer after 10 years of exposure to 10 ppb 
TCE exposure compared to no TCE exposure. A relative risk of 
1.0 means that TCE has no effect on liver cancer. A relative 
Figure 3   Posteriors over inches of rain on Labor Day 2010.
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risk of 2.0 means that a person exposed to 10 ppb for 10 years 
has twice the probability of getting liver cancer as someone  
not exposed. In Figure 4, Scientist A believes that overall there 
is an effect of TCE, but it is relatively small, that is, a relative 
risk of around 1.3. Although her assessment of the size of the 
effect is small, she is quite confident that the relative risk is 
close to 1.3 as her posterior is narrowly distributed around 1.3. 
Scientist B seems to put the most probability around a larger 
effect, a relative risk of 2.0, but as her posterior is much wider 
and more diffuse, she is more uncertain about the size of the 
causal effect than is Scientist A.   
So the Bayesian approach, although imperfect in many 
ways and practically always a challenge to apply, provides one 
way to synthesize the evidence and to express uncertainty 
about general causal claims that might be appealing to the law.  
V.  WHAT’S THE LAW TO DO? 
The final question to tackle is the hardest: what’s the 
law to do? Currently, the courts deal with complicated matters 
of causation in something like the following way. The judge 
must act as gatekeeper and decide which experts will be 
allowed to testify as to the scientific case for or against the 
general causal claim.35 The plaintiffs then mount a case by 
summoning the experts (whom the judge allowed) to argue to 
the jury that the scientific evidence for the general and the 
individual causal claim is compelling. The defense then 
summons their own experts, who argue that the scientific 
  
 35 This is true since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 592-93 (1993).  
Figure 4   Posteriors over relative risk of liver cancer.
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evidence is not compelling, sometimes by impeaching the 
credibility of the plaintiff’s experts, sometimes by emphasizing 
alternative evidence, etc.  
Neither the judge nor the jury is trained to synthesize a 
diverse body of complicated scientific evidence, especially evi-
dence presented by highly partial, highly sophistical experts. A 
better system would have the community of scientists—who 
are presumably both less invested in the outcome and more 
qualified to rationally assess a wide body of complicated 
evidence—come to consensus as to the truth of the general 
causal claims at issue as well as the scientific uncertainty 
around these claims. This output from the scientific community 
could then be used as input to the legal system. This would not 
preclude plaintiffs or defendants from mounting their own 
experts and cases, but it would give the judge and jury a 
perspective on the science to fall back to when they are 
overwhelmed by the briefs submitted or the pyrotechnics in the 
courtroom.  
Such a system is in fact already in place and used 
widely. For example, in decisions as to whether to compensate 
Vietnam veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange and now 
have some illness (like liver cancer), the Veteran’s Administra-
tion does not restrict itself to hearings involving experts from 
both sides; rather, it consults a bi-annual report on the general 
causal claims true of Agent Orange exposure produced by a 
distinguished panel of independent scientists retained by the 
Institute of Medicine, a branch of the National Academies of 
Science.36  
The International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(“IARC”),37 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,38 the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,39 the National 
Institutes of Health,40 and the National Toxicology Program41 
  
 36 See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS 
OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: 
UPDATE 2004 (Nat’l Academies Press 2005). 
 37 INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, IARC MONOGRAPHS 
ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS, Preamble (W.H.O. 2006), 
available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf. 
 38 RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, U.S. EPA, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR 
CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/ 
cancero32505.php. 
 39 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 21. 
 40 National Institutes of Health, News Release, Fact Sheet: The “Report on 
Carcinogens” 9th Edition, http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/may2000/niehs-15.htm. 
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have all developed systems for retaining panels of scientists to 
assess the status of general causal claims and to classify the 
level of evidence in support of such claims, particularly where 
such claims regard chemicals and cancer.  
These panels rarely do a full Bayesian analysis to 
synthesize all the evidence, although as I illustrated with the 
NAS’s BEIR IV report, it is not unknown. Almost universally, 
however, they assign the causal claim to one of four or five 
discrete categories which differ on the truth of the claim and on 
the scientific uncertainty surrounding the claim.42 
For example, IARC forms committees consisting of 
biologists, epidemiologists, and toxicologists. They instruct 
these scientists to first categorize the level of evidence within 
three subcategories—human, animal, and mechanistic—and 
then to synthesize the subcategories of evidence into an overall 
evaluation on a five-category scale ranging from carcinogenic to 
probably not carcinogenic.43 Figure 5 depicts the IARC scheme. 
Each of the categories has natural counterparts to a 
Bayesian posterior, as explicitly described in the Institute of 
Medicine’s 2007 report, “Improving the Presumptive Disability 
  
 41 NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM (NTP), 11TH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 
(U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 2005). 
 42 They of course accompany this categorization with a long and inaccessible 
report.  
 43 See IARC MONONGRAPHS, supra note 37, at 22-23. 
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Decision-Making Process.”44 This sort of categorical output is 
accessible and comprehensible to a judge and to a jury, and the 
steps to reach a consensus on the output are much better 
handled by relatively impartial scientists than by jurors trying 
to weigh evidence described to them by highly partial and well-
paid experts.  
The output of these panels regards the general causal 
claims that must be invoked in a legal case in which an 
individual causal claim is at stake, but the court must still 
decide the individual causal claim. In calculating the 
probability of causation or the years of life lost, for example, 
the plaintiff must appeal to the general causal laws connecting 
the purported exposure and the injury it allegedly caused, but 
the court must still decide whether the estimate of PC of YLL 
is high enough, even allowing for uncertainty in this estimate, 
to warrant liability. This seems like more than enough com-
plexity for juries to be asked to handle. 
 
  
 44 DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING, supra note 17. 
